Tax Competence

the Consequences of Making the Concept of Service More Flexible in Activities with Intangible Properties

Abstract

This work aims to demonstrate that tax competences were established by the Federal Constitution based on rigid concepts that, obviously, cannot be made more flexible. Among these concepts is that of service, as coined by the civilist doctrine, based on the dichotomy between obligation to give and obligation to do. From this perspective, it will be demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the items on the attached list of Complementary Law No. 116/2003, in particular items 1.05 and 1.09, since they represent activities carried out with intangible properties, incompatible with the concept of service. The arguments will go through the form of the State to, from there, delimit the characteristics and purposes of the rules of competence. With doctrinal support, it will be analyzed the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (STF) regarding the concept of service.